MICHEL MARTIN, HOST:
Russia is poised to change its nuclear doctrine. Their deputy foreign minister has told state media that an update is in, quote, "an advanced stage." Our co-host A Martínez talked with Sergey Radchenko about this. He teaches Cold War history at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies.
SERGEY RADCHENKO: The Russian nuclear doctrine, as it stands today, was approved in 2020. This was before Russia's invasion of Ukraine. It spells out circumstances under which Russia might consider using nuclear weapons, and that includes threats to its territorial sovereignty. But then, of course, things changed. Russia invaded Ukraine. The West came to Ukraine's aid and has been providing weapons, and in recent - well, really, since the beginning of the war, Russia has complained about this loudly and accused the West of effectively using Ukraine as a proxy to attack Russia. So when Sergei Ryabkov, the deputy foreign minister, spoke about changes to the nuclear doctrine, this is what he probably referred to - making some kind of an amendment that would account for what Russia sees as Western involvement in the conflict.
A MARTÍNEZ, HOST:
Would Vladimir Putin really consult a doctrine if he wanted to use nuclear weapons? It seems that would be hard for me to believe.
RADCHENKO: So if it comes to ever using nuclear weapons - and Putin has repeatedly said it would be extremely unlikely - then I doubt very strongly that he would actually pull a document off the shelf and say, OK, where can I use the nuclear - you know, nuclear weapons? It's not a situation like that, right? He will use them when he feels that he needs to use them, basically. I don't think that a piece of paper actually explains anything in this regard. And, of course, here in the West, we have to be mindful of not just Russia's intentions, but first and foremost of Russia's capabilities, and that is why the, you know, Biden administration, for example, in its approach to Ukraine war has been fairly careful, testing Russia's red lines very, very carefully to make sure that we do not have inadvertent escalation to the nuclear level, which is something that nobody wants.
MARTÍNEZ: So in some ways, is this more of a symbolic move, just a way to signal to the rest of the world that, hey, we're lowering the threshold to use nuclear weapons if we want to?
RADCHENKO: I think this is what it is. It is part of what you would call perhaps a, you know, psychological operation on the part of the Russians, and it's not a new thing. The Russians, using various channels, have been threatening potential use of nuclear weapons. But, of course, you know, Ukrainians have been pushing back against this Russian narrative, saying, well, look, we've repeatedly crossed Russia's so-called red lines, and Russia has not retaliated. You know, that means that the Russians are bluffing.
Now, in the end, we don't know whether the Russians are bluffing. They may well be bluffing. They are probably bluffing. And they will be bluffing until they no longer bluff. So once again, we have to take Russia's nuclear threats seriously but also not be too panicky about it because I think what really determines the state of a nuclear relationship between Russia and the West is mutually assured destruction. It's not Russia's nuclear doctrine. It's not what Russia writes in a piece of paper. It's the reality that Russia is effectively deterred by American nuclear weapons.
MARTÍNEZ: That's Sergey Radchenko with Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies. Professor, thank you.
RADCHENKO: Thank you for having me.
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